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Abstract. The collapse of an investment mania usually reminds people that
the phrase “This time is diﬀerent” is dangerous. Recollections of this mantra
then typically either state outright or at least imply that “It is never diﬀerent.”
However, there is at least one counterexample to this cautious view, a giant
and wildly speculative investment episode that was proﬁtable for investors. The
British railway mania of the 1830s involved real capital investment comparable,
as a fraction of GDP, to about $2 trillion for the U.S. today. It faced with-
ering skepticism and criticism, much of it very reasonable, as its supposedly
rosy prospects were based on extrapolation from the brief experience of just a
couple of successful early railways. Yet by the mid-1840s, it was seen as a great
investment success.
The example of the railway mania of the 1830s serves as a useful antidote
to claims that bubbles are easy to detect or that all large and quick jumps in
asset valuations are irrational. This episode also suggests the need to reexamine
much of the work on business cycles and diﬀusion of technologies. The standard
literature in this area, starting from Juglar, and continuing through Schumpeter
to more recent authors, almost uniformly ignores or misrepresents the large
investment mania of the 1830s, whose nature does not ﬁt the stereotypical
pattern.
1 Introduction
The literature on investment manias, meaning episodes of intense investor excitement, is
dominated by cases that lead to collapses. As an example, the 1989 edition of Kindleberger’s
Manias, Panics, and Crashes [18] explicitly declared (pp. 3–4):
We are not interested in the business cycle as such, the rhythm of economic expansion
and contraction, but only in the ﬁnancial crisis that is the culmination of a period
of expansion and leads to a downturn. If there be business cycles without ﬁnancial
crises, they lie outside our interest. Isolated ﬁnancial crises that prove so manageable
as to have no eﬀects on the economic system will also be neglected. The ﬁnancial2 Andrew Odlyzko
crises we shall consider here are major both in size and in eﬀect and, as a rule,
international in scope.
The popular perception is that this is the inevitable result of all rapid asset price rises.
For example, in 2009 the economist and political columnist Paul Krugman claimed that
“bubbles always burst sooner or later,” [19].
Neither a mania nor a bubble has a precise deﬁnition. In this paper, a mania is taken to
denote an episode of intense investor excitement, accompanied by a ﬂow of money and price
rises. A bubble, in the popular sense that arises in the Krugman quote, usually denotes
a rapid rise in valuations of some assets, which is implicitly or explicitly assumed to be
followed by a collapse. For economists, a bubble is a rise in asset valuations that is not
justiﬁed by fundamentals. In the early 19th century, a bubble meant a company created
primarily to swindle investors (as in the South Sea Bubble, as the South Sea Company was
perceived to be in that category). The topic of this paper, the British railway mania of the
1830s, involved a rapid rise in prices and substantial ﬂows of investment funds, so certainly
qualiﬁes as a mania. It was followed by a price collapse, so in the popular sense it was a
bubble. However, the ﬂow of investment money continued, prices recovered, and investors
got to enjoy above-market returns. Thus this mania was not a bubble in the economics
sense, as it was justiﬁed by fundamentals.
By any standard other than that of the larger and more famous Railway Mania of
the 1840s, the one of the 1830s was giant. At the peak of the ﬁnancially exuberant early
phase, British investors undertook to plow over 8% of their country’s GDP into the new
infrastructure, equivalent to over $1 trillion for the U.S. today. (By way of comparison,
estimates of rebuilding the U.S telecommunications infrastructure with ﬁber range between
$150 and $300 billion. The wasteful and wasted spending on U.S. long-haul ﬁber networks
during the Internet mania amounted to only about $100 billion.) By the time they were
done, half a dozen years later, cost overruns had led British capitalists to invest twice
that much, equivalent to about $2 trillion for the U.S. today. But within a few years they
were happy, as they were earning above-market returns. In the fall of 1845, just as the
excitement of the big Railway Mania was reaching its peak, The Times (of London) was
railing against what it saw as a mad and dangerous new folly. However, an observer had a
rejoinder, based on the experience of the mania of the preceding decade, which had faced
similar opposition:
Of the 27 old companies some have succeeded to the extent of more than 150 per
cent. advance on their original value; others 100, 80, 50, 30 per cent.; and all, so
far as I know, are paying a fair percentage, or in the immediate prospect of doing
so, on the capital invested. These, therefore, are not speculations, but triumphant
successes; and the absorption of so much capital in them is no more to be regretted
than the outlay in the dwelling-houses of London, which brings in its return in rent.1
This paper provides a brief sketch of those investment successes of the 1830s. Calling
them “triumphant” is a bit of an exaggeration, as returns were not muniﬁcent, and were a
pale shadow of what promoters had been promising at the start. But they were satisfactory
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The railway mania of the 1830s shows an investment pattern very diﬀerent than the
one that is implicitly or explicitly presented in most discussions on manias. After the
speculative excitement died down, there was a period of about half a dozen years during
which investors kept pumping money into railway construction. This was done in the face
of adverse, occasionally very adverse, monetary conditions, wide public skepticism, and
a market that was consistently telling them through the years that they were wrong.
Practically none of this is reﬂected in the literature on business cycles and technological
revolutions.
Just how signiﬁcant is the singular experience of the railway mania of the 1830s? It is
certainly possible to argue that it is “the exception that proves the rule.” It is even easier
to argue that this mania is outside the scope of many of the sources cited in Section 5
as deﬁcient in their treatment of this episode. One could argue that the infrastructure
construction funded by equity is radically diﬀerent from the much more frequent, far more
dramatic and attention-grabbing ﬁnancial crises that are associated with large accumula-
tions of debt, typically for consumption.
On the other hand, one can also argue that the railway mania of the 1830s should be
studied precisely for the reasons listed above. Its culmination did not lead to a downturn
and crisis. Instead, it resulted in the creation of a productive transportation system that
had a deep and positive eﬀect on the economy. It also occurred during the formative
period of corporate capitalism, and its inﬂuence on the shaping of the legal, social, and
institutional framework of modern society has been little explored.
All such considerations are omitted from this paper, although they are considered to
some extent in the manuscript [28] and will be dealt with in more detail in the book of
which that manuscript is a partial draft. All that is shown here, in a brief form, using
widely known and accepted scholarly sources, is that the British railway mania of the
1830s was a ﬁnancial success, and is either missing entirely from most standard works, or
is misrepresented there.
The next section presents the basic quantitative information about the railway mania of
the 1830s. Section 3 discusses brieﬂy the size of this bubble, as compared to other ones, and
also the question of what it was that motivated investors to keep pouring money into their
ventures. Section 4 surveys the qualitative and quantitative arguments of the opponents
and skeptics of this mania. Section 5 presents a brief sample of well-known works and how
they treat this historical episode.
2 The British railway mania of the 1830s
The core of this section is composed of the ﬁgures, which display the timing and scale of
this episode of rational exuberance. The sources for the key data are widely respected pub-
lications, primarily [14,21,26]. The basic reference work [26] in turn relies on the extensive
scholarship of many authors. The precise sources of the various items will not be delved
into here, in the interests of brevity. There are uncertainties about many of the measures
of the British economy in the early 19th century. In particular, the estimates of total ﬁxed
capital investment (Fig. 4) are just educated guesses. However, the uncertainties about
railway statistics are small enough so as not to aﬀect the conclusions of this paper.4 Andrew Odlyzko
Many of the relevant quantitative measures of the British economy as a whole, and
of the British railway industry, are conveniently collected (principally from [14,21,26]) in
tables 1 and 2 of [28]. That manuscript also has graphs that extend ﬁgures 3 and 4 of this
work to cover the period 1830 through 1850, thus including the runup to the railway mania
of the 1830s, as well as the rise and collapse of the Railway Mania of the 1840s. Figures 6
and 7 of this paper are based on original research, described below, but are not essential for
the arguments of this paper. Thus all the critical data comes from widely accepted sources
that have been available for a long time.
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Fig.1. Railway share prices in Britain, May 1827 through end of 1851.
Fig. 1 presents the Gayer-Rostow-Schwartz [14] index of British railway share prices.
The big spike on the right represents the great Railway Mania of the 1840s. It drew in
as investors Charles Darwin, John Stuart Mill, and the Bront¨ e sisters, among others, and
ended in great disappointment. In 1855, the Economist wrote that “[m]echanically or sci-
entiﬁcally, the railways, with all their multiplied conveniences and contrivances, are an
honour to our age and country: commercially, they are great failures.”2 The investment
debacle of the Railway Mania of the 1840s arose to a substantial extent because the earlier
railway mania of the 1830s was perceived as a success. The goal of this paper is to establish
that there were solid grounds for investors in 1845, say, to think of the exuberance of the
1830s as justiﬁed.
Fig. 2 is based on the same data as Fig. 1, and presents in more detail the period 1833
through 1844. The spike on the left side of the graph reﬂects the excitement in 1835 and
1836. (This exuberant episode was part of a more general investment mania. The non-
railway components of that mania, with corporate, or joint-stock, banks, most prominent
among them, came to the usual dismal end.) The dramatic rise in the index towards the endThis time is diﬀerent 5
of this period corresponds to the early phases of the Railway Mania, and will be discussed
in more detail at the end of this section.
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Fig.2. Railway share prices in Britain, 1833 through end of 1844.
If we ignore the fact that the rise in the index represented in Fig. 2 in 1844 was due
to increased share prices of companies started during the 1830s, this ﬁgure by itself is
consistent with the popular view of bubbles, as reﬂected in the title of [6], “Boom, Bust.
Repeat.” Investors get excited, plow lots of money into some venture, watch prices crash,
and go away to nurse their wounds. Then, a decade or so later, after the painful memories
fade, they come back for another ﬂeecing. This view is reinforced by Fig. 3, which shows
miles of new railways authorized by the British Parliament3. Since promoters relied on
the right of eminent domain for almost all railway projects, they needed to get permission
from the government. This required substantial preparation, eﬀort, and expense, all of
which were easiest to obtain during a boom.
However, ﬁgures 2 and 3 are also deeply misleading. If we consider actual capital expen-
ditures, a diﬀerent picture emerges, shown in Fig. 44. The money needed for the preliminary
steps of doing surveys, going to Parliament, etc., was relatively small when compared to
the cost of constructing railways. Investors did not just buy shares when a company was or-
ganized and put them away. They became subscribers, liable for calls up to the full amount
of their shares. Thus somebody involved in a railway project that had nominal £50 shares
might initially put down £2 per share as a deposit. This would pay for the preliminary ex-
penses of the venture. If approval was obtained from Parliament, and construction started,
that investor (or any one else purchasing those shares in the market later) would receive
calls every few months for £3 or £5, up to the limit of £50 per share. (That is how venture
capital or private equity investments function today. Investors, such as pension funds and6 Andrew Odlyzko
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Railway mileage authorized by British Parliament
Fig.3. Railways authorized in the United Kingdom from 1833 through 1844.
university endowments, do not send in all their money at once. Instead, they respond to
calls when fund managers ﬁnd appropriate opportunities to deploy the money.)
Fig. 4 shows that the heaviest investments (which were about three-quarters equity,
one-quarter debt, although primarily equity in the initial years) took place in 1838 and
1839, and amounted to about 2% of GDP each year, comparable to $300 billion per year
for the U.S. today. By comparison, the Obama administration’s 2009 economic stimulus
package of $787 billion, spread over two years, amounts to a bit under 3% of GDP each year.
(If we use government spending as a standard of comparison, then railway investments in
the late 1830s were far larger than the stimulus package.) Further, the period 1837–43 of
heavy railway investment, at least 1% of GDP each year, was dominated by depressions,
ﬁnancial panics, and high interest rates. Fig. 5 shows short term interest rates. The spike in
1839 corresponds to the famous crisis in which the Bank of England (which was a private
bank, although with special privileges) came close to shutting its doors, and had to get an
emergency loan from the Bank of France5. There had been a smaller ﬁnancial crisis in late
1836 into 1837, associated with the panic of 1837 in the United States. The low total ﬁxed
investments in 1841–44 were caused by a deep depression. This depression did not have
too much of an eﬀect on railway investments, which tailed oﬀ primarily because the lines
projected in the 1830s were reaching completion.
Fig. 4 shows aggregate railway investments resulting from the railway mania of the
1830s. An enlightening example of how this process looked for individual equity investors
is presented in Fig. 6. The London and South Western Railway (LSWR) started out as the
London and Southampton Railway, and received its Act from Parliament in 1834. Its basic
shares were of £50 each, with an initial deposit of £2. As construction proceeded, there
were cost overruns that had to be covered, as well as the additional expense of a branch
line. These were covered by issuance of new shares, as well as borrowings. New shares wereThis time is diﬀerent 7
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Fig.4. Railway and other ﬁxed capital investment in the United Kingdom from 1833
through 1844.
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Fig.5. Open market interest rate and the Bank of England discount rate, 1833 through
end of 1844.8 Andrew Odlyzko
oﬀered to existing shareholders on a pro rata basis. Fig. 6 shows the hypothetical ﬁnancial
outcome of the owner of a single original share who took the proportional fraction of all
new share oﬀerings, and paid all required calls6. At the end of 1843, that person would
have owned 2.31 shares, valued by the stock market at £172 (and £200 in mid-1844), and
would have invested £95.5 over the years, as opposed to the initial expectation of £50. The
dividend for the second half of 1844 was £2 per share, so this person would have received
£4.62, for an annual rate of 9.68% on the investment7. This was regarded as exceptionally
lucrative in an era when the risk-free rate on long-term government obligations was about
3%. But at the start of the period represented by Fig. 6, in June 1835, such investor would
have paid £10, and seen the market value it at £5.5. In fact, over most of the next two and
a half years, the market was telling this investor that the LSWR venture was a mistake,
as prices were mostly below the paid-up values.
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Fig.6. London and South Western Railway (LSWR) share price and shareholder invest-
ment, June 1835 through December 1844.
Fig. 7 shows the dividend rate on an original share of the LWSR. It is not adjusted for
the additional shares an investor might have acquired, and the 8% rate for the second half
of 1844 indicates that a single £50 share received a dividend of £2 for those 6 months.
The ﬁnancial history of the LWSR is just an illustrative example, and is not a central
part of the thesis of this paper. The LWSR worked out better for its shareholders than
most lines of the 1830s (although not as well as some). Still, the increasing proﬁtability of
LWSR visible in Fig. 7 was experienced by many other lines.
What were the market yields that railway shares might be expected to match? At the
very end of 1844, British government long-term bonds were yielding 3%. Dividends on
Bank of England shares were 7% on the nominal value of £100 shares, but those shares
were selling for about £210 each, so the market yield on these shares was about 3.3%.This time is diﬀerent 9
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Fig.7. London and South Western Railway (LSWR) dividend rate, June 1835 through
December 1844.
East India Company shares were paying 10.5% dividends on the nominal value of their
shares, and the market yield was about 3.6%. On slightly riskier equity, 4% was about the
minimum acceptable rate of return8.
Campbell [4] shows that dividends of 52 established railways (all from the 1830s, whose
main lines were complete by 1843) reached 4.3% on invested (“paid-up”) capital in early
1843, and then “increased steadily, reaching a peak of 7.3 per cent in July 1847.” A dividend
rate of 4.3% was, by the standards listed above, satisfactory, although not outstanding,
barely justifying the investment. On the other hand, 7% yield was regarded as excellent.
There are some other measures of the proﬁtability of British railways on the eve of the
Railway Mania. In 1850, Lardner, p. 264 of [20], estimated that the return on total capital
employed on British railways was 3.9% in 1844, and 4.3% in 1845. Arnold and McCartney
[1] using modern (and conservative) measures, computed the rates of return for a large
collection of railways (representing about 71% of total capital of the British rail industry).
They found (Table 1 of [1]) that the average rate of return on total equity was 4.44%
in 1843 and 5.07% in 1844. (Their measure fell to 4.67% in 1845, and lower thereafter,
as the unproductive capital being invested in new lines swelled. This is not inconsistent
with Campbell’s ﬁnding that dividends grew until mid-1847, since in the accounting of
the period, branches and extensions of existing railways were handled through separate
accounts, whereas Arnold and McCartney considered total capital invested in the railway
industry. To evaluate the economic success of the lines from the 1830s, we should disregard
those separate accounts representing investments of the Railway Mania of the 1840s.)
The rapid rise in the railway share index visible in 1844 in Fig. 2 represents a combi-
nation of several factors. One was the increasing proﬁtability discussed in the paragraph
above. Another was the drop in interest rates, visible in Fig. 59. Finally, there was antic-10 Andrew Odlyzko
ipation of proﬁts that additional railway investments would bring10. These factors, plus
the bias among investors in a bull market towards looking at the positive side, did lead to
the verdict of the share market in 1845 that that the railways initiated during the boom
of the 1830s were indeed “triumphant successes.” A more sober look, considering just the
state of the industry in 1845, shows that railways were ﬁnancial successes, although not
triumphant ones, especially when compared with promoter promises in the 1830s of 10–
15% dividends, and the long time that shareholders had to wait to enjoy those returns.
But it is easy to excuse contemporary investors for being in an exuberant mood, especially
when one considers where they had been a few years earlier.
The fate of an investor in the LSWR, who saw market values frequently lagging in-
vestments, was common. In fact, it was more common than for the LSWR, which was
started earlier than most, went into service along its full length in May 1840, while many
other lines were still under construction, and was considerably more proﬁtable than most
railways. In January 1840, the aggregate equity investments in a particular large collection
of the principal British lines were £23.3 million and were valued by the stock market at
£25.0 million. That at least shows some net gain for investors. However, most of these lines
were showing prices below paid-up values. If we exclude the Liverpool and Manchester, the
Grand Junction, and the London and Birmingham, the three large lines that had been in
service for a while, and were serving the choicest routes, we ﬁnd in this collection aggregate
investments of £18.0 million being valued at £14.9 million, for a 20% loss11. Many lines
showed far greater depreciation. As an example, one of the more extreme ones, a share of
the Bristol and Exeter Railway, on which £40 had been paid, was valued at that time at
£15. In some cases, shares were sold at negative prices, in that the seller paid the buyer, in
order to avoid the liability for future calls. Those who bought railway shares during such
periods could look at them in 1845, at the start of the Railway Mania of the 1840s, as true
“triumphant successes.”
3 The size of the railway mania and investor motivations
Fig. 4 shows that British investors persisted in pouring money into railways through thick
and thin, mostly thin, over more than half a dozen years. But the incremental decisions
to invest more were not always undertaken willingly. Had shareholders been presented
with the question of whether to put more money into their ventures, without any prior
commitments, the course of the late 1830s and early 1840s would likely have been diﬀerent.
However, these shareholders were not faced with an abstract investment decision. First of
all, they had large sunk investments behind them, and so were naturally inclined to take an
optimistic view of future prospects. Even more important, they were subscribers, obliged
to respond to calls up to the full amount of their shares. Non-payment could lead to
lawsuits by management or forfeiture of shares. On the other hand, this obligation was not
absolute. If enough shareholders were opposed to further investments, projects could be
abandoned. For example, during the Railway Mania of the 1840s, about half of the mileage
authorized by Parliament was not built. During the mania that started in the mid-1830s,
though, almost all projects were carried to completion. There was enough faith in the
projects, and enough manipulation by interested parties, for votes to turn out in favor ofThis time is diﬀerent 11
continuation12. This occurred in spite of adverse circumstances in the economy in general,
as well as almost universal cost overruns, and widespread perception that promoters and
engineers had intentionally presented overly rosy prospects. Thus although most of the
investments were made some years after the speculative excitement of 1835–36 had died
out, those frenzy years did play a major role in getting railway construction going. These
issues are worth exploring in more depth in order to understand the role of investment
manias in economic and technological progress. Somewhat more detail of the course and
setting of the railway mania of the 1830s is presented in [28].
Just how big was the railway mania of the 1830s, and how does it compare to others?
That is a diﬃcult question to answer for most manias, especially since most of the activity in
them is usually just a transfer of money from one group to another. The South Sea Bubble,
for example, involved astronomical notional amounts, but practically no real investments.
Much money changed hands, but there were no big ﬂeets of ships built for the South Sea
trade, no docks, no manufacturing facilities. The British investment mania of the mid-
1820s, described brieﬂy, with references, in [28], was regarded in the early 19th century as
comparable in size and degree of folly to the South Sea Bubble. According to one accounting
by a contemporary observer (summarized in Chapter 5 of [28]), companies established in
the mid-1820s had nominal capital of £370 million. However, in the end total investments
came to only £18 million (on top of £25 million that was loaned to foreign governments
during that episode of irrational exuberance). Another accounting, by the Economist at the
peak of the Railway Mania in 1845, using diﬀerent measures, came up with the following
comparison of the the manias of that period13:
Table 1. Comparison of British investment manias of the ﬁrst half of the 19th century.
mania nominal capital deposits
1824–25 £205 million £35 million
1834–37 150 23
1844–45 692 78
For comparison, British GDP in that period was around £500 million per year. In the
end, actual railway investments for projects started in the 1830s (including a few that
predate the mania peak of 1835–36) came to about £70 million by the end of 1843. Thus
they dwarfed all other real investments resulting from the manias of the mid-1820s and
1830s. Some more comparisons:
– Total British investments in the U.S. during the 1830s have been estimated at about
£35 million ([16], p. 85).
– In 1842, an analysis of equity markets in the UK showed total nominal capitalization
of £224 million, with £57 million coming from railways ([34], p. 157).
Hence by any reasonable standard, the real capital investments of this railway mania were
indeed huge even when compared to the size of the economy, and far larger than from most
other manias. (Those of the Railway Mania were about twice as large, see Table 2 in [28].12 Andrew Odlyzko
Those of the railway mania of the 1860s were almost as large as those of the Mania of the
1840s, but were spread over a longer period, and took place in an economy almost twice
as large.)
4 The British railway mania of the 1830s and its skeptics
The British railway mania of the 1830s had armies of organized opponents and even larger
hordes of skeptics ranged against it. Much of the activity came from economic interests,
especially canals and turnpikes, that were threatened by the new technology. But there
were many other sources of opposition, such as aristocrats trying to protect their favorite
fox hunting grounds and educational institutions (Cambridge, Eton, and Oxford promi-
nent among them) concerned about moral corruption of their students. These activities
have been covered extensively in the literature, starting with the early histories of British
railways by Francis [12] and Williams [38] in the early 1850s. What this coverage largely
misses, though, is the solid foundations for much of the criticism of railway expansion
plans. For a more careful consideration of this issue, see [28], especially Chapter 8 there.
In particular, aside from the potential impact on competitors and society at large, there
was the central issue of whether railways would be proﬁtable. There were serious doubts
about the projected construction budgets. There were also substantial questions about
estimates of demand, as those were made using a systematic but untested methodology.
The locomotive-powered railway was developed for slow transport of heavy coal wagons
over short distances. To the great surprise of most railway enthusiasts, demand for fast
passenger transport materialized suddenly, and provided most of the revenues. But that
had been initially demonstrated only on a single large 30-mile line. The experience of that
line was then extrapolated to other localities, and long trunk lines. It succeeded, but only
through a fundamental misunderstanding. Promoters and investors had expected most of
the demand to be for travel between terminal cities of the trunk lines, whereas actual
demand turned out to largely involve intermediate stations, a fact that did not become
widely known until the late 1840s. (See [28] for more details.) Thus investment in railway
involved not just risk, but huge uncertainty.
Two eminent and prominent economists of that era, John Ramsay McCulloch and John
Stuart Mill, were both enthusiastic about the utility of railways for society. However, both
were skeptical about investors being able to make money from them. Mill declared in 1836
[25] that “on the face of the matter it seems absurd to suppose that both the Great Western
Railway, and the London and Southampton, can pay; though it is just possible that either
of them might, if the other did not exist.” (Both lines were paying very well by the end of
1843.) In early 1837, McCulloch wrote:
There was, in fact, for some time, quite a mania in favour of [railways]; many of
which were, in consequence, entered into without due consideration; and it is not,
perhaps, very likely, unless some discovery be speedily made by which the cost of
their construction may be materially lessened, that half the projects of this sort
now on foot, supposing they were realised, will aﬀord a remunerating dividend, at
least for some considerable period. Some of the best lines, such as that from LondonThis time is diﬀerent 13
to Birmingham and thence to Manchester, and from London to Brighton, London
to Bristol, &c., may, no doubt, be expected to yield an ample return. We incline,
however, to think that the expectations entertained with respect to the immediate
productiveness even of those lines are too sanguine.14
Just like Mill, McCulloch turned out to be almost completely wrong. Almost all the projects
were built, contrary to the doubt he implied in writing “supposing they were realised.”
Almost all of those were also able to “aﬀord a remunerating dividend” by 1843. Further,
not only was no “discovery ... speedily made” for lowering costs of construction, but the
skeptics’ fears turned out to be extremely well justiﬁed. Final costs on most lines came
to about twice the original estimates. However, demand estimates turned out, from the
perspective of 1845, say, to be amazingly accurate, more accurate than most estimates that
are made today for large transport projects. This is detailed in [28]. The methodology was
based on several false assumption that canceled each other out to produce good results. The
cost overruns meant that realized proﬁts were far smaller than initial estimates. Fortunately
those estimates had been so generous that the ﬁnal outcome was very satisfactory for
investors, especially when compared to all other investments made during the manias of
the 1820s and 1830s.
The skepticism of both McCulloch and Mill was reasonable, it’s just that it turned out
to be incorrect. It is hard to predict accurately how society, technology, and economics will
interact. There were many other highly touted technologies in the 1830s that disappointed
their promoters and investors. As one example, in the early 1830s, before the railway mania
of that decade, McCulloch was skeptical about both railways and steam carriages (in the
original 1832 edition of [24]), and so he turned out to be right on one and wrong on the
other. Steam ships, one of the major advances of that era, disappointed many of their
promoters, too.
The main point of this section is to demonstrate that the railway mania of the 1830s was
an extremely speculative one. Investors relied on an untested technology and an untested
demand estimation methodology. Yet they succeeded! That success played a key role in
launching the great (and disastrous for shareholders) Railway Mania of the 1840s. As the
excitement of that bubble was building in early 1845, the Economist wrote:
The origin of the very favourable reception with which railways have met at this
time, is no doubt to be traced to the fact that, of all the schemes which originated
in the speculative period of 1835-36, they were the only ones which stood the test
of the succeeding pressure, without any disastrous losses.15
5 The British railway mania of the 1830s in the literature
This section documents the neglect or misrepresentation of the British railway mania of
the 1830s in the literature. Only a small selection of books is covered, although they are
selected from among the more prominent ones. No attempt is made to discuss the extent to
which this aﬀects the main messages of these books. To do the latter would require a book
by itself. For example, Lewin’s books on early British railways [21,22] are indispensable14 Andrew Odlyzko
tools for any scholar researching that period. They contain a detailed chronology and useful
statistics. Further, coming from an experienced railroad manager, these books explain well
the logic of particular railway links in terms of accommodating various types of traﬃc
ﬂows. But they say very little about the ﬁnancial environment of the time. Lewin did not
attempt to cover railway economics, so it is hard to criticize him for the omission. But it
is possible to argue that a much deeper understanding of the events chronicled in those
books would be obtained if this deﬁciency were remedied. However,that would require a
long discussion. So let us leave that aside, and go on a whirlwind tour of various widely
known books.
There are three features of the railway mania of the 1830s that are important, and
various books will be rated on the extent to which they cover them:
– A. It arose in a burst of general speculative excitement, but faced extensive skepticism,
much of it well grounded.
– B. Investors had to keep providing funding over an extended period, in adverse economic
conditions.
– C. Railways built during this period were viewed as “triumphant successes” in the end.
All three points must have been known to many experts in the area at least in principle.
However, I have found only one book, British Transport by Dyos and Aldcrof [9], which
covers all of them well, although it does so extremely brieﬂy. I am not aware of a single
source that does full justice to A. Hence even a slight mention of those circumstances will
be regarded as satisfactory.
The 2005 edition of Kindleberger’s classic Manias, Panics, and Crashes (this one pre-
pared in collaboration with Aliber) [18] has nothing substantive to say about railroads. Its
listing of “The big ten ﬁnancial bubbles” (p. 5) starts with the Dutch Tulip Bulb Bubble,
which has had a huge impact on popular imagination, but essentially no discernible eﬀect
on the real economy. None of the three big British railway manias of the 19th century make
it into this list of “big ten.” There is a brief acknowledgment (in the table on p. 260) that
railways were somehow involved in the British ﬁnancial crisis of 1847, but that is all. Thus
this book fails on all three points, A, B, and C.
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s This Time is Diﬀerent similarly has nothing on any of A, B, or C.
(Like Kindleberger, this volume is devoted to spectacular events, such as when a banking
system has a seizure, or a government defaults on its obligations, and to the buildup of debt
that usually precedes the seizure.) The table on p. 387 there has a listing of a UK crisis
from March 1837 to 1839, with a reference to the book of Conant, A History of Modern
Banks of Issue [8]. Conant, though, discusses only the monetary situation of the time, and
only brieﬂy alludes to railway speculations that were prominent in early 1836 ([8], p. 629).
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ conclude their Preface ([32], p. xxxv) with the comment:
We hope that the weight of evidence in this book will give future policy makers
and investors a bit more pause before next they declare, “This time is diﬀerent.” It
almost never is.
Unlike the other sources cited earlier, they astutely inserted the qualiﬁer “almost,” although
they did not present any counterexamples that call for it. This paper ﬁll that gap.This time is diﬀerent 15
Among modern books on long waves of investment and technological innovation, As
Time Goes By of Freeman and Lou¸ c˜ a [13] talks of “two waves of investment in 1834–7 and
1844–7” (p. 190). This ﬁts neither the pattern of Parliamentary authorizations nor actual
real capital investments, and has no detailed discussion. Thus one can say that A, B, and
C are all lacking.
Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital by Perez [29] does not have a clear
chronology of the railway age. It does nominate the period 1848–50 as a “turning point”
in the “installation and deployment” dating of the phases of what it calls the “2nd Great
Surge”, the “Age of Steam and Railways” (p. 57). But it does not explain why this time
slot (coinciding the with collapse of the Railway Mania) is a better candidate than the
railway manias of the 1830s and 1860s, and how the presence of three instances of extreme
investor exuberance about the same technology aﬀects the main thesis of the book.
Nairn’s Engines That Move Markets [27] discusses the railway manias of the mid-1820s,
mid-1830s, and the mid-1840s, and shows graphs of share prices and Parliamentary autho-
rizations during those periods. However, there is neither a sense of how speculative the
investments were, nor of the long stretch over which capital was being raised for the lines
started in the 1830s, nor that they turned out in the end to be seen as “triumphant suc-
cesses.” So we can say that A is covered partially, but neither B nor C is.
Chancellor’s Devil Take the Hindmost [5] does mention the “railway fevers” of the
mid-1820s and mid-1830s. However, the discussion of the latter (as in the statement that
“[w]hen the boom progressed to bust in 1837, the crisis extended to the railways,” [5], p.
125) suggests that railway investment stopped at that point. So we can say that points B
and C are missing.
The investment manager Jeremy Grantham carried out a study of 28 large investment
manias that spanned several centuries. He claimed that “[e]very one of the 28 went back
to trend, no exceptions, no new eras, not a single one that we can ﬁnd in history” [37].
His procedure (looking for excursions of at least two standard deviations from the mean
in prices) does show the railway mania of the 1830s following that pattern, as indeed
railway share prices did return to trend by early 1840s in Fig. 2. But this is a matter of
methodology, and his methodology ignores all the spending that took place after the crash
of 1837.
Among more general history books, the ﬁrst volume of Clapham’s Economic History
of Modern Britain [7] does discuss the speculative excitement of the railway mania of the
mid-1830s, and so covers A, at least to some extent16. However, in the treatment of the
late 1830s and early 1840s, Clapham’s book mentions low share prices, but not the heavy
calls. And it does not make it clear that by the mid-1840s, those railways started in the
1830s were nicely proﬁtable. So one can say that [7] covers A, but misses both B and C.
Among general books on transport history, Bagwell’s The Transport Revolution [3]
covers A slightly, B rather well, but misses out on C. British Transport by Dyos and
Aldcrof [9] was already mentioned as providing good, although brief, coverage of all three.
Ransom’s The Victorian Railway and How It Evolved [30] covers all three points with
varying degrees of accuracy17.16 Andrew Odlyzko
In the second half of the 20th century there were a number of deep studies of early
British railways by economic historians such as C. H. Feinstein, G. R. Hawke, R. J. Irving,
A. G. Kenwood, B. R. Mitchell, H. Pollins, and M. C. Reed. They are the principal sources
for the data in [26] and thus indirectly for Section 2 of this paper. Apparently the ﬁrst
careful study to recognize and quantify the extent to which the railway mania of the 1830s
stretched far beyond the limits of its speculative genesis was A Study in Trade-Cycle History
by Matthews, [23]. In Chapter 8, pp. 106–113 and 120–123, Matthews did an admirable job,
given that this was only a small part of his project, in estimating from scratch the actual
expenditures on railway construction for each of the years 1833 through 1842. He also gave
some sense of the speculative fever of 1835–36. On the other hand, he did not deal at all
with how this boom was perceived in the mid-1840s, as that period was outside the scope
of his study. Thus we can say that he did well on A and B, but not on C. Of subsequent
works, I will just brieﬂy comment on Reed’s Investment in Railways in Britain, 1820–1844
[31]. An extremely valuable work, it presents much material not available elsewhere. It has
extensive coverage of B, the long stretch of investments in adverse circumstances, and the
ﬁnancial tools that were used. It also has some coverage of A and C, but those can be
questioned. In particular, by stopping some of his data collection at 1843 (for example, in
the table on p. 25), Reed missed the large increase in railway industry proﬁts in 1844–45,
so that his discussion on what motivated the Railway Mania on p. 268ﬀ can easily be
criticized.
Let’s next consider some earlier works. Juglar was a pioneer in the study of business
cycles. His attention in [17] was directed primarily at ﬁnancial crises. He knew that railways
were the most prominent objects of speculation in England in 1835. However, he stated
that the results of the mania of 1835 were the same as those of 1825 ([17], p. 66), which was
true for the non-railway elements of that mania, but false for railways. A few pages later,
he had a section entitled “Fin de la crise et liquidation (1839–1840)” ([17], p. 69) which
discussed the ﬁnancial mopping up of the crisis of the late 1830s. It does not mention at
all that railway construction was proceeding at full speed during that period. Thus this
pioneer appeared to be totally unaware of the role and nature of the railway mania.
Schumpeter in his Business Cycles placed the end of the ﬁrst identiﬁable Long (Kon-
dratieﬀ) Wave at 1842 primarily because of his perception of railway development in Eng-
land ([33], vol. 1, p. 304). But this perception was faulty. He was aware that railways were
part of the investment mania of the 1830s, but underestimated their role, and the nature
of the investment they attracted. He wrote ([33], vol. 1, p. 278) that
... speculative excitement and its reﬂex in the talk of the time should not induce
us to exaggerate the importance of the, roughly, thousand miles sanctioned in the
boom itself and the, roughly, 490 miles that according to ... had been constructed by
1838, involving a total expenditure of 13.3 million pounds. The great development
that within a few years created almost the whole skeleton of the English railway
system was the work of the forties.
The timing, scale, and eﬀect of the railway mania of the 1830s are thus all represented
incorrectly, and in particular miss the fact that money pouring into railway construction
was rising in 1838. This misunderstanding is conﬁrmed by another quote from the book,This time is diﬀerent 17
to the eﬀect that the Railway Mania of the 1840s was “the one full-ﬂedged railroad boom
which England experienced” ([33], vol. 1, p. 343), which ignores the booms of the 1830s
and 1860s.
Juglar, Schumpeter, and other early thinkers did not have convenient collections of
economic statistics, such as those of [26], at hand. Those are products of the extensive
modern scholarship cited earlier. Still, it would not have been hard for Juglar or Schumpeter
to get a rough sense of the extended period over which the railway mania of the 1830s
unfolded (say from the data in government reports showing how many miles of railway
were being opened to traﬃc in the early 1840s, miles that clearly came from the concluding
phases of the investment of that mania). They may have been partially misled by reading
one of the basic and most respected sources for the economic history of that period, Tooke’s
History of Prices [35,36]. Tooke is one of the many fascinating personalities of that era.
Born in 1774, he was a successful businessman who, starting in his 40s, became one of the
most inﬂuential monetary economists of his time. He was also one of the earliest promoters
of the London and Birmingham Railway, and served as a director of this company for over a
dozen years. In addition, he invested in some of the new lines of the Mania. Thus if anyone
might be expected to have a good understanding of the economic aspects of railway growth
in England, it surely would be Tooke. Unfortunately the actual treatment in his book is
disappointing. There are some interesting comments about early railways in [35], vol. 2, pp.
275–76. In vol. 3, published in 1840 and covering the years 1838–39, he mentioned (p. 278)
“the very large amount of capital which is absorbed, and wholly unproductive of immediate
income (whether permanently so is another question),” primarily in railways. So he was
aware large investments were involved, but there is no unambiguous statement that “the
very large amount” was still growing rapidly, and that the total was going to double over
the next ﬁve years. And there is that doubt as to whether those funds would ever cease to
be “wholly unproductive.” In 1848, he published vol. 4, which covered the years 1839–47.
There, in explaining the origins of the Railway Mania around 1844, he stated that one of
the main motivations came from “the favourable results of the investments made in the
principal lines of railway then in operation” (pp. 63–64). However, he did not say anything
about his earlier skepticism having proved wrong, nor about the extended period over
which those “investments made in the principal lines of railway then in operation” had been
carried out. The 5th volume of the work, published in 1857, had a very extensive section
on railways. This section was written by Tooke’s collaborator, the well-known economic
statistician William Newmarch. However, “the opinions expressed, and the tenour of the
information conveyed, [had Tooke’s] entire concurrence” ([36], vol. 5, Preface, p. ix). One
passage there stands out for being clearly and completely incorrect (([36], vol. 5, p. 371):
In 1835 and 1836, nearly the whole catastrophe was comprised in the ﬁrst great
collapse. Shares bought at [£50] fell to [£5], and remained there; and the whole of
the fall was so much lost to the holder. But, severe as that loss might be, it was
the whole calamity that could befall him. Not so with the Railway Subscriptions of
1845. Those subscriptions entailed the obligation of meeting a long series of Calls,
extending over three or four years; and, in truth, the cases were but few in which the18 Andrew Odlyzko
necessity of meeting the calls was not a far greater misfortune than the depreciation
on the ﬁrst price.
Since Newmarch was born in 1820, perhaps one could excuse him for not understanding
that the speculations of the mid-1830s involved an even more prolonged period of painful
calls than those of the mid-1845s. (It was only the outcome that was dramatically diﬀerent.)
However, it is hard to understand how Tooke could have let this passage pass. He was 83
at the time this volume was published, but according to his obituary, was in possession of
his full mental powers.
Another amusing example of a combination of short memories and basic innumeracy,
where Tooke was directly responsible, and at a younger age to boot, occurs in [35], vol.
4, footnote on pp. 313-14. This footnote presented a table of railway capital expenditures
from 1840 through the ﬁrst half of 1847, based on ﬁgures cited by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer in a speech in the House of Commons on Nov. 26, 1847 (reported in The Times,
Nov. 27, pp. 2–3). The ﬁgures for 1840 and 1841 in that table were zero and £1.47 million,
respectively, too low by £9.7 and £5 million, respectively. How could such preposterous
ﬁgures get presented and be widely accepted? Well, a careful reading of the speech by
the Chancellor of the Exchequer (which was full of warnings that precise estimates were
impossible, and all estimates had to be treated with caution) shows that the ﬁgures he cited
were only for spending resulting from Parliamentary authorizations from 1840 and later
years. But almost all of the expenditures for the projects of the railway mania of the 1830s,
including the cost overruns, had been approved by 1839. The Times used a leader (Nov.
27 issue, p. 4) to acclaim the speech as having refuted the claims of another politician:
The salient points of absurdity in Lord George Bentinck’s statistics were so numerous
that we found it impossible to notice more than a portion. It was tantalizing indeed
to see so luxuriant a crop, and feel that human hands could not grasp more than a
handful.
Unfortunately, while there were “points of absurdity” in Bentinck’s statistics, such points
were, if not equally numerous, than certainly more misleading, in the statistics of the Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer. It is hard to understand how Tooke could accept those statistics
as valid.
Tooke was not the only contemporary observer to miss some of the salient features
of the railway mania of the 1830s. Walter Bagehot, the famous 19th century economist,
political commentator, and editor of the Economist, declared in 1856 [2]:
A great deal has been written and is being written on panics and manias - a great
deal more than with the most outstretched intellect we are able to follow or conceive;
but one thing seems certain, that at particular times a great many stupid people
have a great deal of stupid money. ... Every now and then, from causes which are
not to the present purpose, the money of people of this class—the blind capital (as
oculists call it) of the country—happens to be particularly large and craving; it seeks
for some one to devour it, and there is “plethora”—it ﬁnds some one, and there is
“speculation”— it is devoured, and there is “panic.”This time is diﬀerent 19
Bagehot was born in 1826, so was a young boy during the railway mania of the 1830s.
However, had he inquired of people still alive, or investigated in published sources, he
would have discovered that sometimes the seemingly “stupid money” is not so stupid, or
is at least lucky, and instead of being “devoured,” gets multiplied.
The Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz study [14] is adequate on A, but fails on B and C. It
shows no understanding of the fact that actual capital investments trailed Parliamentary
authorizations by years. For example, it claims ([14], vol. 1, p. 284) that
... the crisis of 1836 ... brought about a stagnation in new investment generally. There
was some revival in 1838 and the early months of 1839, but from the ﬁnancial crisis
of 1839 to the return of monetary ease and general conﬁdence in 1842 enterprise was
at a fairly low level.
This is simply wrong, at least for the substantial portion of “enterprise” that involved
railways. Later, in the discussion of the origins of the Railway Mania of the 1840s, there is no
recognition of the role that the perception that the railways of the 1830s were “triumphant
successes” played in giving rise to the Railway Mania of the 1840s.
6 Conclusions
The British railway mania of the 1830s is neglected and misrepresented in the literature. It
was a giant and very speculative undertaking that succeeded. That time was really diﬀerent.
This is something that policy makers should keep in mind in considering episodes of great
investment exuberance. The implications of this historical event for investment manias and
technology diﬀusion deserve much deeper investigation.
Notes
1The Times, Sept. 2, 1845, p. 2, anonymous letter entitled “Railway speculation.”
2The Economist, September 15, 1855, pp. 1010–1011.
3Data derived from [21], p. 186.
4Data taken from [26].
5The Bank of England discount rate is taken from [11], vol. 2, pp. 275–76. The open
market rate, “for ﬁrst class mercantile bills,” is taken from [36], vol. 6, p. 544.
The railway share index in Fig. 2 peaked in April 1836, some months before the
ﬁnancial conditions of that year started worsening. That is consistent with some comments
from contemporary observers, who noted that speculation had turned away from railways
and towards other ventures, especially banks, around that time. Thus it was not high
interest rates, or a general stock market crash, that stopped railway promotion20 Andrew Odlyzko
6Prices and paid up values for most years obtained from Herapath. This serial started
out as the monthly Railway Magazine and eventually evolved into the weekly Herapath’s
Railway and Commercial Journal, and is commonly called just Herapath. For the years
1841–42, values were taken from the Railway Times. Adjustments were made for various
new share issues, except for those of 1844, which were ignored. There were 20,000 initial
shares of £50 each. In 1837, additional 16,000 shares of £25 each were created, but ones
that carried the same rights to dividends as the original shares. (In other words, these were
shares being sold at a 50% discount.) Later there were 6,000 Gosport shares of 1839, and
42,000 “tenths” shares of 1841 that became 4,200 regular shares. In those last two cases
shareholders were expected to pay through calls the full £50 per share.
7As usual, “your mileage may vary.” Many shareholders did not have enough faith in
the enterprise to pay the calls, or lacked the means to do so. Those who sold out were often
heavy losers.
A person who only paid the obligatory minimum on LSWR, namely the full set of
calls on an original £50 share, ended 1843 with an investment worth only about 50% more
than was paid up, and a dividend yield of 8%.
In all these computations, the time value of money is ignored, as it was ignored as
a ﬁrst approximation in early Victorian times.
8A quote from 1845 in [4] is just one example showing an expectation of a 4% yield on
equity investments.
9Fig. 5 shows only short term interest rates. Long term rates did not vary much during
this period, at least not by modern standards. According to [15], Table 19, pp. 195–96,
the interest rate on 3% Consols varied in the range of 2.96 to 3.56% during this period.
However, the reﬁnancing of a large part of the huge national debt in 1844, which lowered
the nominal interest rate on it from 3.5 to 3% (with a transitional period at 3.25%), had,
according to all contemporary accounts, an immensely stimulating eﬀect on common shares
of all kinds, and on new railways in particular.
10At the end of 1844, which is when Fig. 2 ends, the planned additional railway invest-
ments were relatively modest. Hence it was not unreasonable for investors to expect that
existing companies would be able to proﬁt from this expansion. See [4] for a comprehensive
index of shares prices and dividends during the period 1843–50.
11Valuations obtained from the weekly railway share tables in the Jan. 25, 1840 issue
of Herapath. A particular type of share (some lines had several types) was included in
the calculation only if the table provided the number of shares, the nominal value of the
share, the amount paid up, and a price. Thus this calculation does not cover all the capital
invested in the lines listed there.
12There were a few legal technicalities that complicated the picture, but did not seem
to change the outcome perceptibly. In theory, a railway Act was a contract, which gaveThis time is diﬀerent 21
the company certain rights to issue limited liability shares, acquire land whether owners
wanted to sell or not, and so on, but in return obliged this company to actually construct
the line. In practice, Parliament never tried to enforce these contracts, and there had been
earlier railways as well as canals that had simply been abandoned. On the other hand,
there was no clean way to actually close down a project that investors were not willing to
push forward. It was only in the late 1840s that Parliament enacted legislation to clear up
the legal messes that such situations gave rise to.
13Article “Retrospect and comparison,” the Economist, Oct. 18, 1845, pp. 998–99. That
piece has considerably more detail than is presented here.
14[24], p. 65 of Supplement.
15The Economist, April 5, 1845, p. 310.
16One can certainly quarrel with some of Clapham’s judgment. For example, he wrote
of the peak of the speculative phase ([7], p. 388):
The thing had been overdone during 1836–7. ... Blind capital, seeing its 5 per cent.,
a totally diﬀerent thing from the clear-eyed capital of the Quaker business men from
the Midlands and the North, had accumulated for the raiders.
There is some justice to this quote, new types of investors did emerge to participate in
the railway mania at its peak. However, by that time there was more evidence about both
the technology of railways as well as about demand. Earlier in the decade, when those
“Quaker business men” were so much more prominent, many critics regarded them not as
“clear-eyed,” but as wild-eyed lunatics, venturing huge sums on a wild-goose chase.
17Ransom covered C well, with the statement on p. 81 that shortly before the Railway
Mania, “the trade depression had bottomed out just at the time when the ﬁrst generation of
main lines had been in operation long enough to demonstrate that they were both proﬁtable
and generally beneﬁcial.” But some of the coverage of points A and B is questionable. For
example, his book states (p. 69) that for the Eastern Counties Railway, “great plans proved
over-ambitious and only parts ... were actually built.” The problem was that not with plans
that were over-ambitious, but rather that they were based on exaggerated promises, and
execution was marred by corruption and incompetence. Hence investors balked at funding
the huge jumps in capitalization that would have been required to carry the original plans
into execution.
Acknowledgments
I thank the editor and the anonymous referees for their comments and suggestiongs. This
paper came from a much larger project, which will be documented mostly elsewhere. The
many people and institutions who assisted in diﬀerent phases of that venture are listed at
 http://www.dtc.umn.edu/∼odlyzko/doc/mania-ack.html .22 Andrew Odlyzko
References
1. A. J. Arnold and S. McCartney, “Were they ever ’productive to the capitalist’? Rates
of return on Britain’s railways, 1830–55,” J. European Economic History, vol. 33, no.
2, Fall 2004, pp. 383–410.
2. W. Bagehot, “Edward Gibbon,” National Review, vol. 2, Jan. 1856, pp. 1–42.
3. P. S. Bagwell, The Transport Revolution from 1770, Barnes & Noble Books, 1974.
4. G. Campbell, “Cross-section of a ‘bubble’: Stock prices and dividends during the British
Railway Mania,” Available at SSRN,  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1402642 . Downloaded
May 23, 2010.
5. E. Chancellor, Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation, Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 1999.
6. E. Chancellor, “Boom, Bust. Repeat.,” Wall Street Journal, Oct. 9, 2009.
7. J. H. Clapham, An Economic History of Modern Britain: The Early Railway Age, 1820–
1850, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1926.
8. C. A. Conant, A History of Modern Banks of Issue, 5th ed., G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1915.
9. H. J. Dyos and D. H. Aldcroft, British Transport: An Economic History from the Sev-
enteenth Century to the Twentieth, Leicester University Press, 1969.
10. C. H. Feinstein and S. Pollard, eds., Studies in Capital Formation in the United King-
dom, 1750–1920, Oxford Univ. Press, 1988.
11. J. Francis, History of the Bank of England, Its Times and Traditions, 2nd ed., 2 vols.,
Willoughby & Co., 1847.
12. J. Francis, A History of the English Railway, Its Social Relations & Revelations, 1820–
1845, Longman, Brown, Green & Longmans, 1851. Reprinted by David & Charles, 1967.
13. C. Freeman and F. Lou¸ c˜ a, As Time Goes By: From the Industrial Revolutions to the
Information Revolution, Oxford Univ. Press, 2001.
14. A. D. Gayer, W. W. Rostow, and A. J. Schwartz, The Growth and Fluctuations of
the British Economy, 1790–1850: An Historical, Statistical, and Theoretical Study of
Britain’s Economic Development, 2 vols., Oxford Univ. Press, 1953.
15. S. Homer and R. Sylla, A History of Interest Rates, 3rd ed., Rutgers Univ. Press, 1996.
16. L. H. Jenks, The Migration of British Capital to 1875, Knopf, 1927.
17. C. Juglar, Des Crises Commerciales et de leur Retour P´ eriodique en France, en An-
gleterre et aux ´ Etats-Unis, Guillaumin et Cie., 1862.
18. C. P. Kindleberger and R. Z. Aliber, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Fi-
nancial Crises, 5th ed., Wiley, 2005. (First ed., with Kindleberger as sole author, Basic
Books, 1978.)
19. P. Krugman, “Revenge of the glut,” New York Times, March 2, 2009. Available at
 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/02/opinion/02krugman.html .
20. D. Lardner, Railway Economy; A Treatise on the New Art of Transport, its Man-
agement, Prospects, and Relations, Commercial, Financial, and Social, ..., Harper &
Brothers, 1850.
21. H. G. Lewin, Early British Railways: A Short History of Their Origin & Development,
1801–1844, Locomotive Publishing Co., 1925.This time is diﬀerent 23
22. H. G. Lewin, The Railway Mania and its Aftermath, 1845–1852, Railway Gazette,
London, 1936. Republished with an introduction by C. R. Clinker by David & Charles,
1968.
23. R. C. O. Matthews, A Study in Trade-Cycle History: Economic Fluctuations in Great
Britain, 1833-1842, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1954.
24. J. R. McCulloch, A Dictionary, Practical, Theoretical, and Historical, of Commerce
and Commercial Navigation: Illustrated with Maps and Plans, Longman, Rees, Orme,
Brown, Green, & Longman, 1837.
25. J. S. Mill, “State of politics in 1836,” London and Westminster Review, vol. 3 (or 25),
April 1836, pp. 271–278. Reprinted in The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. 6,
available online at  http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com staticxt&staticﬁle
=show.php%3Fperson=21&Itemid=28 .
26. B. R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988.
27. A. Nairn, Engines That Move Markets: Technology Investing from Railroads to the
Internet and Beyond, Wiley, 2002.
28. A. M. Odlyzko, “Collective hallucinations and ineﬃcient markets: The British
Railway Mania of the 1840s,” January 2010 manuscript available at SSRN,
 http://ssrn.com/abstract=1537338 .
29. C. Perez, Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles
and Golden Ages, Edward Elgar, 2002.
30. P. J. G. Ransom, The Victorian Railway and How It Evolved, Heinemann, 1990.
31. M. C. Reed, Investment in Railways in Britain, 1820–1844: A Study in the Develop-
ment of the Capital Market, Oxford Univ. Press, 1975.
32. C. M. Reinhart and K. S. Rogoﬀ, This Time is Diﬀerent: Eight Centuries of Financial
Folly, Princeton Univ. Press, 2009.
33. J. A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis
of the Capitalist Process, 2 vols., Porcupine Press, 1939.
34. W. F. Spackman, Statistical Tables of the Agriculture, Shipping, Colonies, Manufac-
tures, Commerce and Population of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and its De-
pendencies; Brought Down to the Year 1843, Longman & Co., 1843.
35. T. Tooke, A History of Prices, and of the State of Circulation, 4 vols., Longman,
Brown, Green, Longmans, and Roberts, 1838, 1840, 1848.
36. T. Tooke and W. Newmarch, A History of Prices, and of the State of Circulation,
During the Nine Years 1848–1856, 2 vols., vols. 5–6 of Tooke’s The History of Prices
from 1792 to the Present Time, Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, and Roberts, 1857.
37. S. Ward, “After the Deluge: An elegant thinker deconstructs the stock market’s latest
bubble and its likely aftermath ,” Barron’s, Aug. 6, 2001.
38. F. S. Williams, Our Iron Roads: Their History, Construction, and Social Inﬂuences,
Ingram, Cooke, 1852.